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When Yan Lianke published his novel The Joy of Living (Shou huo)in 2004, in which a gang of disabled villagers sets out to makeenough money to buy Lenin’s embalmed corpse, many readers
may have been reminded of the seemingly boundless symbolic benefits
reaped daily from another embalmed corpse in present-day China: the one
enshrined in the mausoleum on Tiananmen square. Although some may
choose not to see it, Mao’s portrait continues to adorn Tiananmen Gate, as
well as banknotes of all denominations in the latest series, issued in 1999.
Mao-style or Mao-language, a particular form of political rhetoric in which
most of the current leadership was trained, continues to exert undeniable
influence in the political and more largely in the social arena, especially in
the now pervasive discourse of pre-1949 victimisation that has become
China’s national narrative. (1) In the same way, Mao has remained an inex-
haustible topic in intellectual debate, in successive incarnations as de-maoi-
sation, parody, commodification, nostalgia, instrumentalisation, and
rehabilitation, phenomena in turn studied by China scholars around the
world.
As the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) approached,
discussions focused on the purported “red revival” spurred by Bo Xilai’s cam-
paign of chang hong da hei or “Praise the Red and strike down the Black” in
Chongqing, a combination of tough measures on crime, socially inclusive
policies praised by some as harbingers of a new social model, and propa-
ganda steeped in Mao-era references, such as the “red songs” for which
Chongqing had become famous. The Chongqing experiment, launched by a
politician educated during the Cultural Revolution (Bo was born in 1949),
attracted widespread interest overseas and among Chinese intellectuals, a
good number of whom flocked to Chongqing to take up honorary positions
in various academic and semi-academic structures lavishly funded by Bo.
NYU professor Zhang Xudong took up an appointment as dean of human-
ities at Chongqing University, declaring that he was trying to go back to the
“well-rounded spirit of the 1980s.” (2) Modern China published a special issue
devoted to “Chongqing: China’s new experiment” in 2011. In it, Philip Huang
argued that Chongqing’s provision of infrastructure and social welfare by
state-owned enterprises whose access to liquidity was guaranteed by the
ownership of increasingly valuable land represented an unprecedented “third
hand” and a new economic model. (3)
Bo’s fall in March 2012 confirmed what many observers suspected: that
he had mainly used references to the Mao era to garner political capital in
pre-Congress manoeuvring. Nonetheless, the “Chongqing model,” which is
considered by some to have predated Bo’s term as Party secretary of
Chongqing (Mayor Huang Qifan was posted to Chongqing in 2002, five
years before Bo), continued to receive attention as addressing a genuine
need in Chinese society, possibly surviving its most vocal promoter. Others
underline that Bo’s policies in Chongqing were not substantially different
from those defended by Hu and Wen in Beijing, despite marked differences
in style. For all his undeniable strategic motivations, Bo’s re-introduction of
Mao into the political debate unleashed a wide scope of intra- and extra-
Party discussions, ranging from the critique of China’s unequal growth and
the role of the state in the economy to a re-evaluation of the Cultural Rev-
olution and the role of ideology and media control today. Hence, as the
Party prepared for the leadership transition of 2012, in which power is pro-
jected to pass to a generation educated during the Cultural Revolution (Xi
Jinping, born in 1953, and Li Keqiang, born in 1955, were both sent down
to the country as zhiqing or educated youths), it once again staged its di-
visions over personalities in ideological terms, as has long been its practice. 
This special issue of China Perspectives attempts to situate developments
in Chongqing and the Bo Xilai affair within the context of the struggle over
the legacy of Party history, ideology, and legitimacy, and in particular over
the reference to Mao in the contemporary political, social, and intellectual
debates. Indeed, Mao might seem an unlikely choice to embody new policy
options in what Chan Koon-chung has called China’s present “age of pros-
perity” or shengshi 盛世. (4) The intensifying factional struggle between the
Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin camps has demonstrated that the intra-Party
succession procedures much touted five years ago are in fact far less effi-
cient than surmised, and that the handover of power remains the regime’s
Achilles heel, as previously illustrated (at their own expense) by Liu Shaoqi,
Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang. Indeed, the line-up
of the incoming standing committee that seems most probable today, with
a possible majority of members close to the retiring age of 68, portends an-
other similarly violent power struggle in five years’ time. Chinese intellec-
tuals and large parts of the population are sidelined in these conflicts, and
many commented on the Bo affair as a kind of drama they could only watch
from the outside. At the same time, this ubiquitous conflict of interest
groups (liyi jituan) in which the population has no role has served to reveal
the dissatisfaction of many intellectuals with what Wang Hui terms the “de-
politicisation” of the Hu Jintao era, in which policy choices are justified in
technical rather than political terms. In this context, the reference to Mao
– because it is a permissible “politicised” reference – serves to legitimise
the reintroduction of politics into the technocratic debate, dominated by
China’s rise and prosperity. As Wang Hui’s own writings illustrate, Mao seems
to be the only available reference to “repoliticise” Chinese politics, and thus
continues to structure the political forum.
Mao himself remains a controversial persona in the intellectual debate in
China. While the 1981 “Resolution on certain questions in the history of
our Party since the founding of the PRC” tried to strike a balance in pre-
serving the pre-1949 Mao, as well as Mao at the core of the collective lead-
ership in 1949-1956, while condemning partly or wholesale the Mao of later
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years, the question of a more radical de-Maoisation is one that regularly
surfaces in China. In the lead-up to the 90th anniversary of the Party in 2011,
a rumour circulated on the Chinese Internet that the Politburo had passed
a secret resolution in December 2010 demanding to remove Mao’s name
from all Party documents. This was subsequently disproven by Xi Jinping
and Hu Jintao’s marked mention of Mao in the anniversary speeches, but
retired Party historian Xin Ziling, author of The Fall of the Red Sun (Hong
Taiyang de yunluo), one of the probable sources of the rumour, continues
to advance his ideas online and in interviews, together with economist Mao
Yushi and other liberal activists. On the other end of the spectrum, the idea
of rehabilitating Mao’s concept of “New Democracy” as an expression of
China’s “third way” was put forward by Carl Schmitt-admirer Zhang
Musheng and strongly endorsed by Liu Shaoqi’s son Liu Yuan, a major-gen-
eral in the PLA and rumoured to be an ally of Bo Xilai. “Red” websites such
as Utopia or Maoflag, though temporarily shut down after the fall of Bo, are
likely to come back on line eventually.
Meanwhile, as local archives of the pre-Cultural Revolution era begin to
open, it is noteworthy that not only foreign academics or investigative jour-
nalists or writers (Yang Jisheng, Liao Yiwu) have begun to conduct archival
research on the Mao era, but also academics employed by universities in
the mainland, such as the late Nanjing University professor Gao Hua, who
published a ground-breaking study of the CCP’s time in Yan’an, How the Red
Sun rose (Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqi de) in 2000, or his colleagues
at East China Normal University, Shen Zhihua and Yang Kuisong. (5) Most re-
cently, retired Peking University professor Qian Liqun published in Taiwan a
two-volume, 800-page monument entitled The Mao Era and the Post-Mao
Era (Mao Zedong shidai he hou Mao Zedong shidai), in which he argues that
“Mao culture” remains pervasive in today’s China and has precluded the
emergence of true critical thinking in the PRC. Qian explores some alterna-
tive foundations of such thinking, including a chapter devoted to the un-
justly forgotten economist Gu Zhun.
Returning once more to Mao, while it may be timely, also runs the risk of
repetition. Many of the current developments in the treatment of Mao date
back to the 1990s and the aftermath of Tiananmen. Geremie Barmé’s anthol-
ogy Shades of Mao (1996) and his monograph In the Red (1999) were the
first full-fledged discussions of the culturally commodified but politically am-
biguous renewed Mao cult of the 1990s. The volume Critical Perspectives on
Mao Zedong’s Thought, edited by Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight in
1997, contained equally thought-provoking questions about Mao’s contem-
porary relevance. Two further recent edited volumes should be mentioned:
Mao’s Invisible Hand, edited by Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry,
which, as its title suggests, examines the lasting impact of Mao in today’s po-
litical structures and policies, and Re-envisioning the Chinese Revolution, ed-
ited by Ching Kwan Lee and Yang Guobin, which takes a more bottom-up
approach in examining popular collective memories of the Revolution in gen-
eral and, in several essays, of Mao in particular. The present collection takes a
slightly different though complementary approach. Maoism or Mao-era ref-
erences are not considered only as an implicit structure of the polity, an “in-
visible hand” that continues to influence the interactions of state and society;
the hypothesis is rather that the many explicit references to Mao are relevant
to understanding the political, social, and intellectual debates about the future
of the People’s Republic, in a context in which politics is dominated by interest
groups without clear political agendas.
In the first contribution, Willy Lam retraces the most important as-
pects of the Chongqing Experiment and Bo Xilai’s uses of Maoist ref-
erences on the political scene, which may well continue beyond the
fall of Bo. Arif Dirlik analyses how Mao is presented and discussed in
official historiography, the goal of which remains to “save” Mao from
the Cultural Revolution in order to cement his place as the Sinifier of
Marxism and the founder of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Geremie Barmé analyses the “red legacies” in current intellectual and
political debate, and their manifold mutations, political ambiguities,
and international connections. Sebastian Veg examines the figure of
Mao in two recent state-sponsored blockbusters, appraising the role
of propaganda in Hu Jintao’s new cultural policy, as well as Mao’s place
in the national narrative. Finally, in a more personal essay, historian
Ding Dong starts out from his own experience of Maoism before re-
examining it in the context of recent critiques of the Chairman, plead-
ing for a more empirical approach to the emotionally charged issues
surrounding his legacy. The possibility of carrying out more archival
research, including within China, is certainly encouraging, and may
point towards a goal that still seems far-off: a social consensus on Mao
and the Chinese Revolution within the narrative of modern Chinese
history.
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